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I.  INTRODUCTION 
China has had a long history of high levels of piracy and counterfeiting.  Leaders of China’s 
Food and Drug Administration have confessed that their pharmaceutical market is immersed in fake 
and deadly drugs.1  In addition, DVD’s and VCD’s 2 containing pirated versions of Chinese and 
foreign films or television series are easily found in China’s major cities.3  Since China is the 
world’s fastest growing economy and the contributor of the largest trade deficit to the United States 
(U.S.) (U.S. $268 billion in 2008), 4 it is no surprise that the issue of Intellectual Property Right 
(IPR) counterfeiting and piracy are of national interest to the U.S..  
For years the U.S. has voiced its complaints about piracy and counterfeiting activities in 
China, and the United States Trade Representative (USTR) has had China on its Priority Watch List 
for allegedly not providing an adequate level of IPRs protection or enforcement.5  Unable to resolve 
U.S. concerns, the U.S. initiated a WTO dispute against China in April of 2007 – DS362: China – 
Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights.6  Specifically, 
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1 David Barboza, A Chinese Reformer Betrays His Cause, and Pays, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2007, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/13/business/worldbusiness/13corrupt.html. 
2 Video CD, abbreviated as VCD, is a standard digital format for storing video on a Compact Disc. Wikipedia, Video 
CD, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Video_CD. 
3 See Rogier Creemers, The Effects of WTO Case DS362 on Audiovisual Media Piracy in China, EUR. INTELL. PROP. 
REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 1), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1434914. 
4 U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Statistics, Trades in Goods (Imports, Exports and Trade Balance) with China, 
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html.  
5 See Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., 2005 Special 301 Report 1 (Apr. 29, 2005); Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., 2006 
Special 301 Report 1 (Apr. 28, 2006); Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., 2007 Special 301 Report 2 (Apr. 30, 2007); Office 
of the U.S. Trade Rep., 2008 Special 301 Report 19 (Apr. 30, 2008).  
6 See generally Panel Report, China-Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 
WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/362r_e.pdf [hereinafter Panel 
Report]. 
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the U.S. charged China with violating its obligations under the Trade Related Aspects of 
International Property Rights (TRIPS)7 Agreement.   The U.S. brought three claims concerning 
copyright, customs, and criminal law.8 
In January of 2009, the WTO panel found a number of shortcomings in the protection of 
IPRs in China that were incompatible with TRIPS obligations.9 According to the WTO panel, it is a 
violation of TRIPS for China to refuse copyright protection of works that do not meet China’s legal 
standards.10  Additionally, simply removing an infringing trademark as the only precondition for the 
sale at public auction of counterfeit goods seized by Chinese customs authorities was found 
impermissible.11  The panel, however, found insufficient evidence to conclude that China’s threshold 
for prosecution in its criminal law was a violation of TRIPS.12  Both parties accepted the panel’s 
findings, and China negotiated with the U.S. to implement the recommendations by March of 
2010.13  
The outcome of this WTO case is relevant for various reasons.  Despite what the USTR regarded as 
a favorable ruling for the U.S.,14 this panel decision did not translate into substantive improvements 
in intellectual property (IP) protection and enforcement in China.  The outcome of this WTO case 
revealed limitations of the WTO forum in implementing IPR enforcement obligations under TRIPS 
against China in matters related to copyright piracy and trademark counterfeits.  Furthermore, the 
case reaffirms the view that pressuring China to make certain legislative changes in order for the 
                                                
7 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS 
Agreement]. 
8 See generally Panel Report, supra note 6.  
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id.  
13 Communication from China and the United States, China – Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights – Communication from China and the United States Concerning Article 21.3(b) of the DSU, 
WT/DS362/13 (Mar. 7, 2009).  
14 Press Release, USTR, United States Wins WTO Case over Deficiencies in China’s Intellectual Property Laws (Jan. 26, 
2009), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2009/january/united-states-wins-wto-dispute-over-
deficiencies-c. 
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country to comply with internationally mandated obligations, such as TRIPS, may not be the U.S.’s 
best approach to fighting counterfeiting and piracy.  Therefore, this article seeks to propose a better 
alternative: China should be allowed time to develop into a country which is better equipped to 
enforce IPRs and fully comply with its TRIPS obligations.  
II. ENFORCEMENT OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT  
A. THE TRIPS AGREEMENT  
 In most countries, copyright piracy and trademark counterfeiting are considered crimes.15  
There are differences, however, in the ways that countries enforce their IPR laws. 
 The TRIPS Agreement was negotiated as part of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations in 1986,16 and after seven years of highly contentious negotiations, the agreement was 
signed in 1994 and came into force on January 1, 1995.17  As a result of the emergence of TRIPS, 
the main forum for rulemaking shifted from the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a 
specialized United Nations agency dedicated to promoting the protection of IP around the world,18 
“to the newly created [WTO], and [the agreement] transform[ed] the substantive rules” of previous 
international IP standards.19  
 The TRIPS Agreement represented the “furthest reach of multilateral harmonization [and] 
[integration] efforts,” and from the perspective of developed countries, the substantive terms of the 
TRIPS Agreement were desirable and more protective than existing international IP accords.20  
While it adopted many provisions of previous multilateral treaties administered under WIPO, such as 
                                                
15 MARTIN K. DIMITROV, PIRACY AND THE STATE 1 (2009).  
16 FREDERICK M. ABBOTT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY 3 
(2007). 
17   Id. 
18 World Intellectual Property Organization, What is WIPO?, http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/what_is_wipo.html 
(last visited Nov. 14, 2009).  
19 ABBOTT ET AL., supra note 16, at 3-4. 
20 Id. at 4. 
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the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property21 and Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,22 the TRIPS Agreement provided more stringent 
“minimum standards” or minimum levels of IPR protection. 23   
 One very important innovation of the TRIPS Agreement was the availability of enforcement 
measures of IPR,24 which were absent in the Paris Convention and the Berne Convention.  The 
TRIPS Agreement requires members to establish effective yet “fair and equitable” procedures for the 
enforcement of IPRs, including providing remedies to prevent further infringement.25  Members are 
obligated to provide IPR holders with access to civil judicial procedures to enforce their rights,26 and 
parties are given the opportunity to present evidence.27  In addition, damages and injunctions are 
available.28 Judges are given the authority to order the destruction of infringing goods.29  Members 
must provide procedures under which IPR holders provide notice to customs authorities of suspected 
shipments of infringing goods, and to establish procedures for the suspension of entry into 
commerce.30  Members are also required to make available criminal procedures and penalties for 
willful trademark infringement and copyright piracy on a commercial scale.31  The TRIPS 
Agreement entered a new international legal ground when it imposed obligations on WTO members 
to adequately and effectively enforce IPRs.  
 
 
                                                
21 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, as last revisited at the Stockholm Revision Conference, July 
14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (concluded in 1883) [hereinafter Paris Convention]. 
22 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, adopted Sept. 9, 1886, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27, 
1161 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. 
23 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 1.3. 
24 Id. Part III. 
25 Id. art. 41. 
26 Id. art. 42. 
27 Id. arts. 42-43. 
28 Id. arts. 44-45. 
29 Id. art. 46.  
30 Id. art 51.  
31 Id. art. 61.  
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B. ENFORCEMENT OF TRIPS BY THE WTO: DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCESS  
 With the emergence of the TRIPS Agreement within the WTO framework, a new centralized 
procedure for resolving IP-related disputes was introduced: the Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU).32  Article 64.1 of TRIPS grants members 
access to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism for disputes arising under TRIPS.33  The DSU lays 
out a structured procedure for dispute resolution arising under the WTO.  The WTO contains a 
single unified body that administers all disputes, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).34  Panels of  
governmental and nongovernmental individuals who objectively assess the facts of each case and 
apply the necessary rules to make recommendations or rulings assist the DSB.35  Furthermore, the 
DSU allows parties to appeal a panel’s decision to the Appellate Body, a permanent entity consisting 
of seven judges.36  The DSU automatically adopts the report of the panel and Appellate Body,37 
unless there is a unanimous objection within a reasonable timeframe.38 
 The DSB will request that the offending member remedy the inconsistency if a panel or the 
Appellate Body rules that a particular measure is inconsistent with a member’s treaty obligations.39  
If the losing party fails to implement the recommendations and the rulings within a reasonable time, 
the DSU allows for compensation and the suspension of concessions or treaty obligations as 
remedial measures.40   
                                                
32 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Marakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments – Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 112, 1226 (1994) 
[hereinafter DSU]. 
33 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 64.1. 
34 DSU, supra note 32, art. 2. 
35 World Trade Organization, Annex 2: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 
358, 360, http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2009). 
36 DSU, supra note 32, art. 17.  
37 See Glen T. Schleyer, Power to the People: Allowing Private Parties to Raise Claims Before the WTO Dispute 
Resolution System, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2275, 2286 (1997). 
38 DSU, supra note 32, arts. 16.4, 17.14. 
39 YANG GUOHUA, BRYAN MERCURIO & LI YONGJIE, WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDERSTANDING: A DETAILED 
INTERPRETATION 223 (2005). 
40 World Trade Organization, supra note 35, at 368. 
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 Despite previously having had membership in WTO’s predecessor, the General Agreement 
of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1948, it took approximately fifteen years of exhaustive negotiations 
for China to formally attain membership to the WTO in 2001.41  Threatened by the country’s size 
and economic growth rate, China had to make heavy concessions to make its WTO accession 
desirable to the European Community (EC) and the U.S.42  Among many of the commitments made 
conditional to its WTO entry, China promised to implement the TRIPS Agreement in full, including 
the enforcement provisions, from the date of accession.43 
 For China, WTO membership means more than obtaining economic leverage.44  According 
to scholar Dr. Jing Gu, “China is concerned with its identity in the international community, as its 
political and even military and security interests are affected by progress in the domain of 
international trade.”45  In other words, China’s purpose for attaining WTO membership was “to 
better protect its interests, [to] actively to involve itself in the development of the rules of 
multilateral trade regime, including through [WTO] DSU mechanism, and to build up its 
international image.”46 
III. WTO DS362: U.S. V. CHINA  
A.  FIRST CLAIM: COPYRIGHT LAW  
 The U.S.’s first claim addressed China’s denial of copyright protection and enforcement to 
works that are not in accordance with China’s censorship regulations.  According to the U.S., Article 
                                                
41 Press Release, WTO Successfully Concludes Negotiations on China’s Entry, WTO (Sept. 17, 2001), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr243_e.htm; see also World Trade Organization, Accession of the 
People’s Republic of China, Nov. 23, 2001, available at 
http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/directdoc.asp?DDFDocuments/t/WT/L/432.doc. 
42 See generally World Trade Organization, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, Nov. 10, 2001, 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/protocols_acc_membership_e.htm (follow “Report of the 
Working Party” hyperlink) (outlining the special terms in which China negotiated with other members of the WTO to 
attain membership). 
43 Press Release, supra note 41.  
44 Jing Gu, China and the WTO, INST. OF DEV. STUDIES, UK, at 1, http://www.die-gdi.de/CMS-
Homepage/openwebcms3.nsf/(ynDK_FileContainerByKey)/ADMR-7BBFVT/$FILE/Jing-
Gu_China_and_the_WTO.pdf?Open. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 3. 
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4 of China’s Copyright Law did not provide the protection to all works that was required under 
Article 9.1 of TRIPS because the law denied copyright protection to works that had been banned for 
publication, distribution or both under Chinese law.47  Furthermore, since the enforcement 
provisions under China’s Copyright Law were unavailable with respect to works denied copyright 
under Article 4 of that law, this was arguably inconsistent with the enforcement requirement under 
Article 41.1 of the TRIPS Agreement.48   
 China counter-argued that Art. 4(1) of its Copyright Law merely provides that a work that 
fails content review is not protected by its Copyright Law, but this did not deny the copyright 
protection required under TRIPS.49  Responding to the U.S. claim concerning Article 41 of TRIPS, 
China contended that the publication prohibition measures constituted effective actions as demanded 
by TRIPS.50  It also argued that its copyright enforcement procedures were available for right 
holders of any work to go to court and seek remedies.51 
 The panel found that a category of works denied protection under Article 4(1) of the 
Copyright Law was inconsistent with Article 5(1) of the Berne Convention, as incorporated by 
Article 9.1 of the TRIPS Agreement.  The relevant portion of Article 4(1) at issue is as follows: 
“[w]orks the publication or distribution of which is prohibited by law shall not be protected by this 
Law.”52  According to the panel, Article 4 (1) on its face was inconsistent with Article 5(1) of Berne, 
thereby violating China’s obligation under TRIPS.   
Article 9.1 of the TRIPS Agreement provides as follows:  
Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 21 of the Berne Convention (1971) and the 
Appendix thereto. 
                                                
47 Panel Report, supra note 6, para. 3.1.  
48 Id. para. 7.161. 
49 Id. para. 7.162. 
50 Id. para. 7.164. 
51 Id. 
52 Copyright Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 7th Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 7, 1990, effective Jun. 1, 1991, 
revisited Oct. 27, 2001), art. 4(1), translated in CHINA.ORG.CN China (last visited Dec. 1, 2009) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter 
Copyright Law (P.R.C.)].  
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Article 5(1) of Berne created the national treatment obligation,53where there are “the rights 
which their respective laws do now or may hereafter grant to their nationals.”54  It continues that 
there are also “the rights specially granted by [the Berne Convention].”55  Although “‘the rights 
specially granted’” are not defined, the panel held that it “refer[red] to rights that authors shall enjoy 
in respect of works.”56 
 The panel explained that the “‘works’” denied protection under Article 4(1) of Chinese 
Copyright Law applied to some, if not all, categories of works that should be protected under Article 
5 of Berne Convention,57 including the works that had failed content review and the deleted portions 
of works edited to pass content review which were not afforded protection under Article 4(1) of 
China’s law.58  Although Article 17 of the Berne Convention gives governments certain rights to 
control the exploitation of works,59 the panel elaborated that copyright protection of private rights60 
was clearly distinguishable from government censorship addressing public interest;61 therefore, there 
was no reason to assume that the right to censorship would entirely eliminate copyright protections 
to private copyright owners against third parties from exploiting prohibited works under Article 5(1) 
of Berne.62  
 As to Article 41.1 of TRIPS, the panel reviewed Chapter V of China’s Copyright Law, 
entitled “Legal Liabilities and Enforcement Measures.”63  Under Chapter V, “Article 46 provide[d] 
for civil liability for [eleven] types of acts of infringement,” and “Article 47 provide[d] for civil and 
                                                
53 Panel Report, supra note 6, para. 7.106. 
54 Berne Convention, supra note 22, art. 5(1). 
55 Id. 
56 Panel Report, supra note 6, para. 7.107. 
57 Id. para. 7.115. 
58 Id. para. 7.103.   
59 Berne Convention, supra note 22, art. 17. 
60 See fourth recital of the preamble to the TRIPS Agreement.  
61 Panel Report, supra note 6, para. 7.135. 
62 Id. para. 7.139. 
63 Id. para. 7.166. 
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administrative liability and investigation of criminal liability for eight specific types of action.”64 
Enforcement procedures under the Copyright Law included “orders to cease infringement, to pay 
compensation for damages and to confiscate the products of infringement, and provisional measures 
to order discontinuation of the infringement and to preserve property.”65 
The panel held that since a right holder of a work denied copyright protection under Article 
4(1) of the Copyright Law was denied rights of private copyright enforcement, 66 China’s law was 
inconsistent with TRIPS Article 41.1, which requires enforcement procedures against “any act of 
infringement of intellectual property rights covered by [the TRIPS Agreement].”67   
B.  SECOND CLAIM: CUSTOMS MEASURES  
 In its second claim, the U.S. contended that China’s Customs Law was inconsistent with 
Articles 46 and 59 of the TRIPS Agreement68 because the law created a scheme giving Chinese 
customs authorities the option of disposing IP-infringing goods seized at the border instead of 
destroying the goods, thereby encouraging the infringing goods to enter the channels of commerce.69 
 China responded that in reading Article 59 of TRIPS in conjunction with Article 1.1 of 
TRIPS, its customs officers possessed flexibility and had wide discretion to determine whether its 
obligation under Article 59 was met.70 
 The Customs IPR Regulations and relevant Implementation Measures and Public Notices set 
out that confiscated goods shall be handled in the following order: 
1. donating the goods to public welfare bodies or assigning the goods to the IP rights holder 
with compensation;  
2. auctioning the goods after completely eradicating the infringing features and packaging of 
the goods; and  
3. destroying the goods if the infringing features cannot be eradicated.71 
                                                
64 Id. 
65 Id. para. 7.167. 
66 Copyright Law art. 4(1) (P.R.C.).  
67 Panel Report, supra note 6, para. 7.175; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 41.1. 
68 Panel Report, supra note 6, para. 7.197. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. para. 7.198. 
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Article 59 of TRIPS in relevant part provides as follows: 
[C]ompetent authorities shall have the authority to order the destruction or disposal of 
infringing goods in accordance with the principles set out in Article 46 . . . . 
 
Article 46 of TRIPS provides as follows: 
In order to create an effective deterrent to infringement, the judicial authorities shall have the 
authority to order that goods that they have found to be infringing be, without compensation 
of any sort, disposed of outside the channels of commerce in such a manner as to avoid any 
harm caused to the right holder, or, unless this would be contrary to existing constitutional 
requirements, destroyed. . . In regard to counterfeit trademark goods, the simple removal of 
the trademark unlawfully affixed shall not be sufficient, other than in exceptional cases, to 
permit release of the goods into the channels of commerce.72 
  
The panel found that Article 59 of TRIPS only obliged competent authorities to have the 
authority to make certain orders – “‘destruction or disposal.’”73  The panel said that remedies 
ordered "'in such a manner as to avoid any harm caused to the right holders'” found in Article 46 of 
TRIPS was only applicable when the infringing products were disposed outside the channels of 
commerce.74 According to the panel, if goods were sold for charitable distribution, “the goods were 
not in fact disposed of outside the channels of commerce but into the channels of commerce.”75  
Furthermore, “[i]f social welfare bodies charitably distributed goods donated to them by [c]ustoms 
[authorities] but the goods later find their way back into the channels of commerce, this does not 
alter the fact that the goods were disposed outside the channels of commerce, in the ordinary sense 
of ‘disposal.’”76 
                                                                                                                                                             
71 See Regulations on Customs Protection of Intellectual Property Rights (promulgated by the State Council of the 
People’s Republic of China, Dec. 2, 2003, effective Mar. 1, 2004), art. 27, translated in CHINA CUSTOMS (last visited 
Dec. 1, 2009) (P.R.C.).   
72 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 46. 
73 Panel Report, supra note 6, para. 7.249. 
74 Id. para. 7.244. 
75 Id. para. 7.279. 
76 Id. 
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 Since the disposal of infringing goods outside the channels of commerce was an alternative 
to destruction of the goods,77 “any inherent risk of harm due simply to the fact that the goods had not 
been completely destroyed [was] insufficient to disqualify a disposal method, as it would nullify the 
choice between disposal and destruction.”78  The panel also found no evidence that customs 
authorities would donate defective or dangerous goods to charity since Chinese law required the 
confiscated goods to be used for social public welfare and could not be used to the detriment of 
public interest.79  In situations where goods were donated to organizations like the American Red 
Cross, the recipients would not likely be misled to the origin of the goods, nor would it lead to 
damaging or harming a right holder’s reputation.80  Therefore, the panel concluded that the U.S. 
failed to demonstrate that Customs lacked authority to donate goods to social welfare bodies in such 
a manner as to avoid any harm to the right holder caused by lower quality goods.81  The panel also 
upheld the use of sales and auctions as legitimate disposal options.82 
 However, in situations where counterfeit trademark goods were being released into the 
channels of commence, TRIPS required more than the simple removal of the trademark, except in 
exceptional cases.83  In this regard, according to the panel, China’s customs measures violated 
Article 46 of TRIPS, which stated that “the simple removal of the trademark unlawfully affixed 
[was] sufficient to permit release of the goods into the channels of commerce,” allowing release of 
goods into the channels of commerce “in more than just ‘exceptional cases.’”84 
 
 
                                                
77 Id. para. 7.282. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. para. 7.291-7.293. 
80 Id. para. 7.297. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. paras. 7.325-7.353. 
83 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 46. 
84 Panel Report, supra note 6, paras. 7.393-7.394. 
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C. THIRD CLAIM: CRIMINAL THRESHOLDS   
 The last claim brought by the U.S. concerned China’s high thresholds for criminal 
procedures and penalties.  The U.S. alleged that the high thresholds violated Article 61 of the TRIPS 
Agreement because they allowed Chinese infringers to structure their commercial operations to 
ensure that they operated below the relevant threshold evading any criminal liabilities.85  By 
implementing these high thresholds, the U.S. contended that China violated Article 41 of TRIPS, 
which obligates member countries to provide means for enforcement resulting in effective action.86 
 China’s main argument was that it employed reasonable and appropriate criminal thresholds 
for counterfeiting and piracy purposes in compliance with Article 41 and 61 of the TRIPS 
Agreement.87 China employed a narrower and more common usage understanding of “‘commercial 
scale’” under Article 61 of TRIPS to mean “a significant magnitude of infringement activity.”88  
China relied on Articles 1.189 and 41.590 of TRIPS91 to define the standards of Article 61 of TRIPS, 
explaining that it retained considerable discretion with respect to law enforcement. 
 The panel concluded that some acts of copyright infringement might possibly fall below all 
thresholds, thereby not being enforced by criminal proceedings, but that this did not necessarily 
mean that it was a violation of Article 61 of TRIPS.92 
                                                
85 First Written Submission of the United States, China – Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights, p. 2, WT/DS362 (Jan. 30, 2008), available at http://www.ifta-
online.org/Uploads/Issues/58.pdf [hereinafter First Submission]. 
86 Panel Report, supra note 6, para. 7.676; see also TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 41 (“Members shall ensure that 
enforcement procedures . . . are available under their law so as to permit effective action against any act of infringement 
of [IPR]s . . . .”). 
87 Panel Report, supra note 6, para. 7.425. 
88 Id. para. 7.481. 
89 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 1.1 (“Members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of 
implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system and practice.”). 
90 Id. art. 41.5 (“does not create any obligation to put in place a judicial system for the enforcement of [IPRs] distinct 
from that for the enforcement of law in general, nor does it affect the capacity of Members to enforce their law in 
general.”). 
91 Panel Report, supra note 6, para. 7.481. 
92 Id. para. 7.669. 
  13 
 Under Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement, members are required to “provide for criminal 
procedures and penalties . . . at least in cases of wilful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy 
on a commercial scale.”93  According to the panel, “counterfeiting or piracy ‘on a commercial scale’ 
refers to counterfeiting or piracy carried on at the magnitude or extent of typical or usual commercial 
activity with respect to a given product in a given market.”94 According to this definition, 
“counterfeiting or piracy of a particular product [would] depend on the magnitude or extent that is 
typical or usual with respect to such a product in such a market” in China.95  
 The panel reviewed the measures and concluded that “on their face, they did not exclude 
certain commercial activity from criminal procedures and penalties.”96  For example, “[c]ertain 
thresholds [were] set in monetary terms, ranging from ¥20,000 profit to ¥50,000 turnover or sales,”97 
but this did not indicate what this amount represented as compared to a relevant commercial 
benchmark in China.98  Another threshold was set in the amount of copies, but this again did not 
relate to any relevant market benchmark in China either, according to the panel.99  The panel 
especially criticized the U.S.’s evidence, including articles100 and press articles about the Chinese 
market,101 as being insufficient and uncorroborated to demonstrate a level that constituted a 
commercial scale for any product in China.102  According to the panel, the U.S. did not satisfy its 
burden of proof.103  
 
                                                
93 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 61. 
94 Panel Report, supra note 6, para. 7.577. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. para. 7.609. 
97 Id. para. 7.610; see also Criminal Law (promulgated the revised ed. by the Standing Comm. 5th Nat’l People’s Cong., 
Mar. 14, 1997, effective Oct. 1, 1997), arts. 214, 215, 217, 218, translated in ASIAN LII (last visited Dec. 1, 2009) 
(P.R.C.).  
98 Panel Report, supra note 6, para. 7.610. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. para. 7.616. 
101 Id. para. 7.627. 
102 Id. paras. 7.617, 7.628. 
103 Id. para. 7.681. Furthermore, the panel did not rule on the claim under Article 41.1 of TRIPS, exercising its judicial 
economy. Id. para. 7.682. 
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE U.S.-CHINA WTO IP CASE 
Although it appears that the U.S. has prevailed in the majority of its claims, the victory seems 
to be rather meaningless for the U.S in terms of actual curtailing of the piracy and counterfeiting 
levels in China.  After tracking the development of IPRs in China and analyzing the repeated 
attempts by the U.S. government to enforce IP laws there, it can be strongly suggested that even had 
the WTO panel ruled in favor of the U.S., finding that China had violated its obligations under 
TRIPS on all three claims, this ruling would have had minimal impact on China actually satisfying 
the U.S.’s notion of adequate IPR protection and TRIPS compliance.  Minimal amendment of 
Chinese laws, in reality, will not fight against counterfeiting and piracy. 
A. IMMEDIATE EFFECTS 
At this juncture, China does not have to change its criminal prosecution thresholds for IP 
violations under TRIPS. From the U.S. perspective, China will continue to lack enforcement on its 
criminal side by maintaining “safe harbor” provisions, which will allow criminals to commit the IP 
infringement below the specified threshold without the fear of legal prosecution.104   
The bigger problem, however, seems to be that despite the panel’s rulings that found China’s 
copyright protection and its customs disposal system of counterfeited goods to be in violation of its 
obligations under TRIPS,105 implementing the recommendations of the panel in order for China to 
comply with TRIPS will not be burdensome on China.  Implementing the recommendations will 
involve amending and changing laws and regulations on their face, rather than China having to 
change its application or enforcement of existing laws.  Winning a favorable WTO ruling in this 
DS362 dispute, however, will most likely not result in the desired effect of dropping piracy and 
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counterfeiting rates.  The problem at issue does not seem to arise from China’s reluctance to amend 
and enact domestic laws, giving higher IPRs, but rather from China’s failure to enforce such laws. 
In the past, China has significantly changed its written IP laws to comply with the WTO 
obligations under TRIPS. The strengthening of its IP laws, however, does not correlate to effective 
IP protection. For example, Articles 9 through 13 of TRIPS cover copyrights.106 Artistic rights, 
including literary works, music, and visual arts, require copyright protection.107 Today, China’s 
copyright law108 meets many of the TRIPS obligations.  It protects works created by Chinese 
citizens, while international treaties or bilateral agreements protect works created by foreign 
citizens.109 The law includes remedies such as (1) injunctions,110 (2) confiscation of infringing goods 
as well as the materials used to create them, and (3) criminal liabilities,111 as required by TRIPS.112  
Compared to China’s prior copyright law, the current version aligns with its obligation under TRIPS.  
Yet although China has copyright laws which attempt to comply with TRIPS, there is still rampant 
pirating activity reported. “Available statistics on copyright piracy indicate that 88 percent of 
business software (e.g., Microsoft Office) in use in China in 2005 was pirated, leading to losses in 
the U.S. of $1.3 billion from unrealized sales”.113 Overall, losses from all types of copyright piracy 
in China that same year amounted to $2.4 billion.114  
Similarly, considering China’s weak enforcement apparatus, China’s compliance with the 
panel’s recommendations, to provide copyright protection to prohibited works and comply with a 
different disposal method by March of 2010, will likely bring limited legislative impact and not 
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assist in protecting copyright holders.  Even if the U.S. had hypothetically won its criminal threshold 
claim, compliance with TRIPS, under this WTO DS362 dispute, would have merely required China 
to legislatively lower its threshold for triggering criminal penalties for IP infringement. There would 
have been  no assurance that China would adequately enforce such amended legislation.  
B. U.S. REACTION TO CHINA’S IP ENFORCEMENT  
The author’s contention that bringing China to the WTO forum to resolve counterfeiting and 
piracy under TRIPS will have no immediate and desirable effect is further strengthened if one 
analyzes the historical steps that the U.S. employed against China.  History teaches the U.S. that 
imposing economic sanctions or imposing threatened power will not effectively deter counterfeiting 
and piracy activities.    
 For many years China had not developed any notion of IPRs. It was not until the twentieth 
century, as foreign business and investment in China increased substantially, that IP piracy posed a 
serious problem.115 To retain proper IPR protections, the U.S. first used its military and economic 
prowess to provoke China into signing a commercial treaty in 1903. This treaty granted IPRs 
protection to Americans in return for IPRs protection for the Chinese.116  Even after signing this 
treaty, China took years to introduce substantive IP laws: a copyright law in 1910, a patent law in 
1912, and a trademark law in 1923.117 The preambles to these laws, however, offered foreigners very 
little IP protection.  
                                                
115 WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE 
CIVILIZATION 34 (1995). 
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intellectual property protection.” Id.  See also William P. Alford, Making the World Safe for What? Intellectual Property 
Rights, Human Rights and Foreign Economic Policy in the Post-European Cold War World, 29 N.Y.U.J. INT’L L. & 
POL. 135, 138 (1997). 
117 ALFORD, supra note 115, at 37, 41-42. 
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 “After the fall of the Qing dynasty,118 China experienced ‘decades of wars,’ famines, and 
revolutions . . . [IPRs] did not return until the Chinese Communist Party reopened the country to the 
international community in the late 1970s.”119 Unlike the previous ruler, “Deng Xiaoping saw 
economic wealth as the foundation of China’s power and realized that China could not modernize in 
isolation without the benefits of foreign science, technology, capital, and management skills.”120 As 
such, China began pushing for restoration of diplomatic and commercial ties with the U.S. and other 
developed countries, eventually becoming a member of the WIPO.121 Eventually, China advanced 
with promulgating a new trademark law in 1982122 and a patent statute in 1984.123 It also joined the 
Paris Convention in 1985.124 Despite China’s efforts, these new laws as well as bilateral and 
multilateral agreements gave very limited protection to authors and inventors. China, at that time, 
“remained very reluctant to introduce private property rights, as [it] [was] concerned about the 
conflict [IPRs] would create within the socialist economic system.”125 “Thus, instead of creating new 
rights to protect individual authorship and inventions, the new [IP] statutes were . . . primarily to 
rehabilitate authors . . . and inventors by enhancing their position through legal recognition while 
promoting ‘socialist legality with Chinese characteristics’”.126  
 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, “the U.S. government repeatedly threatened China with a 
series of economic sanctions, trade wars, non-renewal of Most-Favored Nation [] status, and 
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opposition to [China’s] entry into the [WTO].”127 Because of these threats, China was repeatedly 
coerced into signing bilateral agreements that intended to show China’s commitment to IP protection 
with the U.S., These agreements included the Memorandum of Understanding on the Protection of 
Intellectual Property Rights in 1992,128 the Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights in 
1995,129 and a similar agreement in 1996.130  Nevertheless, piracy and counterfeiting remained 
widespread in China. The rampant piracy in China led to a loss of approximately $2 billion of 
revenues annually for the U.S. in the late 1980s and early 1990s.131 “According to one industry 
estimate, 99% of all computer software in China was pirated in the late 1990s.”132 
The USTR has continuously put China under its Priority Watch List and threatened unilateral 
actions against China for its inadequate IP protection.133 Under Section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974 
and the Special 301 Provisions of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, the “USTR must 
identify countries that deny adequate or effective protection for IPRs or deny fair and equitable 
market access for persons that rely on [IP] protection.”134 If the problem continues to remain after a 
six to nine month consultation, the U.S. has an option to withdraw trade benefits or impose 
sanctions.135   
 After reviewing the previous efforts by the U.S. to secure stronger IPR protection and 
enforcement from China, it seems clear that threatening China with economic sanctions or other 
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retaliatory measures is not an effective solution.  For example, the 1992 Memorandum of 
Understanding signed between China and U.S. required China to  
(1) adhere to certain levels of IP protection for patents, trade secrets, computer programs and 
sound recordings;  
(2) accede to a number of important international intellectual property treaties, such as the 
Berne Convention . . . ; and  
(3) provide effective border control procedures and remedies.136  
 
Although this Memorandum did result in new Chinese legislation for its copyright law, there 
was a lack of improved enforcement, as “piracy levels still remained among the highest in the 
world”.137 The U.S., once again dissatisfied, labeled China a priority foreign country under Special 
301 and threatened once more to impose strong trade sanctions.138 Further talks eventually led to the 
1995 Memorandum of Understanding, which among other things required China to reduce piracy 
and improve enforcement. This again was ineffective.139  
 The widespread optimism among commentators that piracy and counterfeiting problems in 
China would effectively be resolved by filing a WTO complaint against China, demanding 
compliance under TRIPS, is understandable. The possibility for enforcement of the WTO dispute 
settlement decisions by withdrawal of trade concessions was one of the factors that motivated the 
U.S. to select the WTO as the alternative forum to WIPO. The benefits of the WTO system also 
included stability in the international trading system and a focus on rules rather than coercion.  
 Some commentators, however, have expressed the inadequacy of remedies provided under 
the WTO dispute settlement system.140 While the panel does give recommendations for the member 
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country to bring itself to compliance,141 the WTO lacks enforcement powers.142  Once the panel or 
appellate body report is adopted, and a country fails to comply with the recommendations within a 
reasonable time, the complaining country is either to be compensated,  for instance, by demanding 
tariff reductions, or if no satisfactory compensation is agreed upon, the complaining country is to 
impose trade sanctions such as suspending concessions or treaty obligations.143 
 In the matter of the WTO DS362 dispute, it can be strongly argued that if China does not 
comply with the recommendations by March 2010, “the [U.S.], now consuming more than $250 
billion in imports from China each year”, has the incentive to retaliate by raising tariffs on Chinese 
goods.144  Although this strategy has worked for the U.S. with the European Community (EC),145 
historical patterns reflect that imposing economic and trade sanctions will likely not work as 
effectively for China. In fact, unlike the EC, retaliation may not impose a sufficiently large economic 
loss for China. The EC’s main exports are luxury products, as the Banana case exemplifies,146 where 
its sole market is the U.S. Conversely, most of Chinese exports are lower-end products that may be 
easily exported to alternative markets if retaliation shuts them out of the U.S.  China may choose to 
live with the consequences of noncompliance if it does not strongly hurt China’s economic regime. 
In fact, using sanctions at this point against China might hurt the U.S Much of what China exports to 
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the U.S. derives from subsidiaries of U.S.-based multinational corporations.147 The U.S. would 
probably not prefer to “antagonize firms with significant U.S. shareholder interest.”148 
 Furthermore, the U.S. should be cautious to note that when filing IP-related complaints 
against China, China has had the tendency to respond with counter-attacks. For example, in 1995, 
the Chinese government refused to shut down twenty-nine factories which illegally produced 
approximately seventy million copies of American films and software every year.149  The U.S. 
eventually threatened to block China’s effort in joining the WTO and to impose $2.8 million in 
sanctions.150 China’s response to U.S.’s threats was to take counter-retaliatory measures.151 China 
threatened, among other things, that it would “hold up applications of American companies . . .  to 
set up [business] in China” and would suspend talks with American automobile manufacturers over 
joint ventures.152 
 China operates according to its interests, not foreign threats of economic or trade sanctions. 
The only way the WTO dispute settlement system seems to work effectively is through the good 
faith participation and cooperation of its members to assure that the system works properly. China 
had a purpose when it acceded into the WTO regime, focusing on the importance of trade 
considerations. As such, China knows that it will be in its interest that the WTO system function 
effectively, since it will not only be a respondent in the system, but will also be a complainant for 
future disputes.153  Therefore, China will be keen to reform and enforce its own law so that it is 
compatible with international frameworks of IP protection when its interests are at risk.   
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V. VIABLE SOLUTION: PLAYING THE WAITING GAME 
 Since this paper argues that enforcing any external retaliatory measures or IPRs under TRIPS 
against China are inappropriate at this time, U.S. business owners with IP interests in China might be 
wondering what options remain.   
 Many commentators have blamed China for its lack of enforcement at the legislative level. 
As such, they have suggested the restructuring of China’s IP statutes, especially those that 
demonstrate China’s high threshold for criminal prosecution of IP violations.154 This paper, 
however, shows that often legislative change does not correlate to strong IPR enforcement. 
Some scholars have hypothesized that the problem with enforcement lies in the Chinese 
intellectual property legal system, which places emphasis on compromise and harmony. These 
commentators argues that the system is ill-suited for the strong litigation that is necessary to enforce 
and defend IPRs in a market economy.155 Consequently, instead of allowing the individuals take part 
in the enforcement process, the Chinese government has chosen to deal with enforcement of IPR as a 
state-regulated matter.156 “The underlying view is that the legal system is one of many policy tools 
that the government disposes of . . . . Hence, the majority of copyright infringement cases are dealt 
with administratively.”157  
 Similarly, many claim that the primary reason for China’s lack of enforcement, as well as 
inadequate legal system and IP laws, is due to the combination of Chinese communist culture and 
cultural roots in Confucianism. These cultures differ significantly from the U.S. capitalist culture.158 
According to this theory, it is inevitable that Chinese culture favors group interests over individual 
interests. This directly contrasts with the U.S. ideal of individualism and its idea of IPRs. Alleged 
corruption and lack of will on the part of local authorities seems to contribute to a lack of 
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enforcement.159 The U.S. once stated that China faces a “failure of will . . . not a failure of ability,” 
when it comes to enforcement of its copyright laws.160 To promote this, the U.S. evidenced that 
national government officials as well as local and national political leaders were involved and/or 
responsible for various pirating and counterfeiting undertakings.161 The corrupt Chinese officials 
would have no incentive to enforce copyright laws that would result in a loss of profits from pirated 
goods.   
 While it is true that China has been slow in reforming its IP regime, many commentators 
ignore the developments of IPR in the country that were implemented after its entry into the WTO. 
In 2002, the Chinese government initiated an anti-counterfeiting and anti-piracy campaign, which 
resulted in high numbers of seizures of infringing goods.162  With the assistance of the Chinese 
government, special intellectual property affairs departments and intellectual property protection 
networks were created.163  Furthermore, in 2002, China began allowing research firms to own state-
funded patents.164  This move away from state ownership towards individual ownership shows an 
increase in Chinese citizens’ interest in IP protection.  Lastly, Chinese companies are becoming 
more IP savvy, becoming more innovators than copiers.165  “The patenting activities by Chinese 
companies reflect the progress of IP [development] in China.”166 There has been a sharp rise on 
patenting worldwide by Chinese entities.  In 2007, according to the WIPO, “there had been a 488 
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percent increase in applications from Chinese domestic entities, and during the period from 2000 to 
2006, China’s share of worldwide patent fillings rose from 1.8 percent to 7.3 percent”.167   During 
the same years, the total amount of patent applications filed worldwide by Chinese companies 
increased by 32.1 percent.168  
The Chinese have begun to realize the importance of a well-developed information economy 
and to notice the benefits of protecting IPRs, especially as more Chinese now understand the 
consequences of inadequate IP protection and how the lack of IP protection could gravely damage 
their country and its international reputation.  The U.S., as well as many commentators, should 
acknowledge that, unlike its previous position which considered IPR as a bargaining chip, China is 
beginning to realize that IPRs can help promote national growth and prosperity.   
 In the light of these developments, the author proposes that the U.S. should wait and allow 
China to evolve into a country that is better ready to enforce IPRs. Historically, many less developed 
countries, including the U.S., which was a haven for the pirated works of Charles Dickens,169 as well 
as newly emerging industrialized countries, including Singapore and South Korea,170 experienced 
extensive significant piracy and counterfeiting activities before they reformed their intellectual 
property laws. In fact, the U.S. was one of the more notorious pirating nations in the world in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.171 Section 5 of the 1790 Copyright Act, the country’s first 
copyright statute, stated explicitly that, 
noting in this act shall be construed to extend to prohibit the importation or vending, 
reprinting or publishing within the United States, of any map, chart, book or books, written, 
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printed, or published by any person not a citizen of the United States, in foreign parts or 
places without the jurisdiction of the United States.172 
 
Congress did not extend copyright protection to foreign authors until more than a century 
later and only to those countries that offered the U.S. reciprocal copyright protection.173  As the 
former Register of Copyrights, Barbara Ringer, summarized: “Until the Second World War the 
United States had little reason to take pride in its international copyright relations . . . its role in 
international copyright was marked by intellectual shortsightedness, political isolationism, and 
narrow economic self-interest.”174   
 If history is of any guide, most nations who value strong IPRs appear to have experienced a 
surge of commercial piracy at some point in their history as the country realizes substantial 
economic and technological growth. Allowing China additional time to progress to a stage in which 
IP protection is warranted may be the best option. According to an international commission set up 
by the British government to explore how national IP regimes could best be signed to benefit 
developing countries within the context of international agreements such as TRIPS,175 the 
commission warned: 
[R]apid economic growth is more often associated with weaker IP protection. In 
technologically advanced developing countries, there is some evidence that IP protection 
becomes important at a stage of development, but that stage is not until a country is well into 
the category of upper middle income developing countries. 176 
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 Yet despite the importance of waiting until China realizes that its overall benefits of IPR 
protection outweigh its overall economic costs, making it an upper middle income developing 
country, there is little if any empirical research concerning when a country such as China will reform 
its IPR regime.177 Additionally, according to the World Bank’s 2008 Data, China was categorized as 
a lower middle-income economy country,178 implying that China has not reached the desired 
economic level to initiate a full range of IPR enforcement. However, according to scholar Peter Yu, 
China does not seem far from this “crossover point” when the country will realize the importance of 
IPRs.179 There are primary motivators prevalent in China that evidence a rapid move towards full IP 
enforcement reform, such as (1) the improved “development of local stakeholders who benefit[]from 
stronger protection,” (2) China’s desire “to develop a knowledge-based economy,” (3) China’s “shift 
toward an export-driven economy,” and (4) China’s concern regarding its reputation within the 
international community.180  
VI. CONCLUSION 
 History has taught the U.S. that using retaliatory tactics to spur China to enforce its IP laws 
has had minimal effect in fighting against counterfeiting and piracy in China. For similar reasons, it 
seems the outcome of the WTO case between the U.S. and China under TRIPS, and the 
implementation of the WTO panel’s recommendations by China, will most likely not render the 
effect desired by the U.S.   
Stronger enforcement cannot be developed out of forced changes in Chinese domestic IP laws alone. 
Patience is needed for China to develop an environment in which the conditions necessary for 
successful IP reforms can be realized.  These conditions include a “consciousness of legal rights . . . , 
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an effective and independent judiciary, a well-functioning innovative and competitive system, a 
sufficiently developed basic infrastructure, established business practices, . . . a critical mass of local 
stakeholders,” and the Chinese people being educated about the importance of IP.181 Given the 
current international climate of insecurity and the U.S. economic crisis, the U.S. should be very 
cautious in instigating any conflict with China and should instead strength their cooperation with 
China and attempt to work with China to resolve their differences.182    
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